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TRIBAL PROPERTY: DEFINING THE PARAMETERS
OF THE FEDERAL TRUST RELATIONSHIP UNDER
THE NON-INTERCOURSE ACT: CATAWBA INDIAN
TRIBE V. SOUTH CAROLINA
Mark Ulmer*
Where today are the Pequot? Where are the Narragansett, the
Mohican, the Pokanoket, and many other once powerful
Tribes of our people? They have vanished before the avarice
and the oppression of the White Man, as snow before a sum-
mer sun.
-Tecumseh, of the Shawnee.'
If a man loses anything and goes back and looks for it, he will
find it, and that is what the Indians are doing now when they
ask you to give them the things that were promised to them in
the past; and I do not consider that they should be treated like
beasts, and that is the reason I have grown up with the feelings
that I have....
-Tatanka Yotanka (Sitting Bull).2
All I ask is that, we have worked honestly among ourselves to
resolve our problems and we have dealt honestly with the State
and with the Federal Government. I am not here today seeking
something, simply because I am an Indian. I am here because
we were mistreated illegally and immorally, and that is what I
want corrected.... I know if I was a landowner and someone
came on my land and told me I had to move off it because of
something that happened 200 years before, I would not like it,
either. So I understand their [the present property owners']
feelings, [and] I am willing to work in any framework that we
can do to reach a fair and equitable settlement."
-Gilbert Blue, Catawba tribal chief. 3
* Detroit School of Law; Second place winner, 1984 Indian Law Writing
Competition.
1. D. BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE 1 (15th ed. 1971).
2. Id. at 389.
3. Settlement of the Catawba Indian Tribe Land Claims: Hearings on H.R. 3274
Before the House Comm. on Interior & Insular Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1979)
(testimony of Chief Gilbert Blue) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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Introduction
The Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790 prevents the alienation
of lands owned or possessed by an Indian tribe to any other
party, except the United States, without the consent of
Congress.' It enables the federal government, acting as parens
patriae for the Indians, to void such a transaction made without
its consent.' The statute has provided the legal basis for a
veritable explosion of litigation concerning tribal lands along the
Eastern Seaboard, with the plaintiff tribes seeking reinstatement
of property rights lost long ago.6
The Catawba Tribe is the latest of such litigants. In Catawba
Indian Tribe v. South Carolina,7 the Catawba Indians are at-
tempting to invalidate a land transfer made pursuant to an 1840
treaty with the state involving a 144,000-square-acre tract.' The
problem the tribe faces in the pending litigation, however, con-
cerns not the merits of the land claim itself, but the tribe's stand-
ing to sue.
In 1959 the status of the Catawba Tribe as a federally recog-
nized tribe was terminated pursuant to the Catawba Division of
4. An Act to regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, ch. 33, § a, I
Stat. 137, July 22, 1790; Act of Mar. 1, 1793, ch. 19, 1 Stat. 329, May 19, 1976; An Act to
regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes, and to preserve Peace on the Fron-
tiers, ch. 30, § a, I Stat. 469 (1796); Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 46, 1 Stat. 743; Act of Mar. 30,
1802, ch. 13, 2 Stat. 139; Act of June 30, 1834, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
177 (1982)).
5. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), reh.
denied, 362 U.S.956 (1960); United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926); Passama-
quoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
6. Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99 (1960), re/i.
denied, 362 U.S. 956 (1960); James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71 (1st Cir. 1983), app. docketed No.
83-623 (1st Cir. Oct. 14, 1983); Mashpee Tribe v. Watt, 707 F.2d 23 (1st Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 52 U.S.L.W. 3451 (U.S. Dec. 13, 1983); Oneida Indian Nation v. New York, 691
F.2d 1070 (2d Cir. 1982); Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 1028 (1981); Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1979); Mashpee Tribe
v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979); Passama-
quoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975); County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian
Nation, 53 U.S.L.W. 4225 (U.S. Mar. 5, 1985); Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp.,
423 F. Supp. 780 (D. Conn. 1976); Narragansett Tribe v. South R.I. Dev. Corp., 418 F.
Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976).
7. 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983).
8. P. DAMMANN, D. MILLER& D. ISRAEL, A HISTORY OF THE CATAWBA TRIBE AND ITS
RESERVATION LANDS 1540-1959, at 46-50 (1978), reprinted in Settlement of the Intercourse
Claims of the Catawba Indian Land Claims: Hearings on H.R. 3274 Before the House




Assets Act.9 The tribal constitution was effectively revoked with
permission from the tribe, but the tribe was allowed to remain on
the 630-acre parcel owned by the state. The initial issue centers
around the tribe's ability to prove a prima facie case of existence
under the Non-Intercourse Act, specifically, that the Catawba
Nation is still a "tribe" and that the federal trust relationship
between it and the United States, existent before the Division of
Assets Act, has not been terminated.
The precedent-setting quality of this case is readily apparent.
No federal court has yet determined the effect of a
"termination" act upon an Indian tribe's right to sue under the
Non-Intercourse Act. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
originally granted the Catawbas standing under the Non-
Intercourse Act.' 0 The Fourth Circuit, however, realizing the im-
portance of this issue, subsequently granted the state's motion to
rehear the case en banc."1
9. 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1982).
10. 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983).
11. Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc, Catawba Indian
Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983), granted Dec. 20, 1983. A "sitting
en bane" is a consideration of a case by all of the judges of a United States Court of Ap-
peals. Justice Stewart explained that the en banc procedure was "the exception rather than
the rule," the principle purpose being the opportunity for a majority of judges of the circuit
"to secure uniformity and continuity in its decisions." United States v. American-Foreign
Steamship Co., 363 U.S. 685, 689-90 (1960).
A petition to rehear the case en bane may be filed under one of two Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. Rule 35(a), "Determination of Causes by the Court En Banc," states
as follows:
(a) A majority of the circuit judges who are in regular active service may order that an
appeal or other proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals en bane. Such a
hearing or rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when
consideration by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its deci-
sions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
Rule 40(a), the "Petition for Rehearing," however, presents different criteria when it
states, in pertinent part:
(a) A petition for rehearing may be filed within 14 days after entry of judgment unless
the time is shortened or enlarged by order. The petition shall state with particularity the
points of law or fact which in the opinion of the petitioner the court has overlooked or
misapprehended and shall contain such argument in support of the petition as the peti-
tioner desires to present.
The local rules of the Fourth Circuit complicate the situation even more. They do not
follow the criteria of rule 40(a), but state instead that ordinarily the court will not hear the
case on the motion unless one or more of the following situations occur: (1) a material fact
or law was overlooked in the earlier decision; (2) a change in the law occurred after the case
was submitted, which was overlooked by the panel; or (3) an apparent conflict with another
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This note will examine the Fourth Circuit's initial decision and
analysis concerning the ramifications of the Catawba "termina-
tion" act. The impact of that act is paramount to this case and
may well influence future interaction with and among the other
"terminated" tribes. In discussing the underlying issue of the
federal trust relationship, the court en banc may be required to
define its qualities and limits, recognizing specific elements rather
than applying the more widely used broad generalizations, within
the meaning of the Non-Intercourse Act.
I. Analysis of American Indian Law
In General
In any survey of law concerning North American Indians,
foremost emphasis is placed on the concepts of tribal sovereignty,
federal-state relations, and the nature of the claim asserted by the
tribe or individual. The United States Constitution indirectly
recognizes the difference between race and tribal sovereignty in
decision of the court occurred, which was not addressed in the opinion. See Notice of Judg-
ment, Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, No. 82-1671 (4th Cir. Oct. 11, 1983).
The "exceptional importance" standard of rule 35 has been interpreted by other cir-
cuits to mean issues of legal, rather than political, importance, or extreme social or
economic hardship. Issues of "exceptional importance" concerning American Indian
tribes, which have led to a rehearing by a court en banc, have included Montana's
authority to tax the Blackfeet Tribe's royalty interest from oil and gas production on their
reservation (Blackfeet Tribe v. Groff, 709 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1983)); whether the United
States was liable to the Menominee Tribe for a breach of trust for enacting the
Menominee Termination Act (Menominee Tribe of Indians v. United States, 607 F.2d
1335 (Ct. Cl. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 958 (1980)); and whether the Indian General
Allotment Act of 1887 authorized the award of money damages against the United States
for alleged mismanagement of timber resources located on lands allotted to Indians (Mit-
chell v. United States, 591 F.2d 1300 (Ct. Cl. 1979), rev'd 445 U.S. 535 (1980), reh.
denied, 446 U.S. 992 (1980), on remand 664 F.2d 265 (11 th Cir. 1981), cerl. denied, 457
U.S. 1104 (1982)).
The Fourth Circuit has applied its authority under rule 35 liberally in reviewing prior
panel decisions. This is illustrated in three recent situations before the court. In the case
of North Carolina Util. Comm'n v. FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir. 1977), for example, the
Fourth Circuit set aside strict adherence to the petition by allowing a second panel of
three to substitute for an entire sitting of the active judges, in reviewing the earlier panel's
decision.
Uzzell v. Friday, 625 F.2d 1117 (4th Cir. 1980), involved three en banc hearings, the
third held pursuant to the court's own motion as a result of its violation of a recent
Appellate Rules amendment (28 U.S.C. § 46 (1982)). The court en banc, sitting before the
U.S. Supreme Court, had a chance to rule on the writ of certiorari before it, recalled the
mandate of the second hearing, and remanded the case to the district court.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss1/5
NOTES
two separate places. It specifically grants Congress the authority
to regulate "Commerce with the Indian Tribes."'' 2 The Constitu-
tion also gives Congress, through the President, the right to enter
into treaties with the individual tribes, pursuant to the treaty and
supremacy clauses.' 3
The tribe itself is an independent political, rather than racial,
entity. The Supreme Court has reiterated many times that Con-
gress cannot deal with Indians solely as a racial group. 14
Commensurate with the American system of jurisprudence, as
well as the doctrine of federal preemption, the jurisdiction of in-
dividual states upon Indian country is limited. The Indian com-
merce clause provides plenary power for Congress, in the absence
of express delegation or abrogation, to review any action by a
state government affecting Indians." The power to deal with and
regulate Indian tribes is wholly federal. It does not follow from
the commerce clause, however, that a situation of "automatic"
preemption arises. I6
Indian treaties stand on essentially the same footing as those
made With foreign nations. 7 As they were made pursuant to the
Constitution by power vested in the President and Congress, they
take precedence over any conflicting state law on the basis of the
supremacy clause. 8 More than three hundred treaties were
entered into between the United States and the various Indian
12. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. The applicable clause states: "The Congress shall have
Power To .. .regulate Commerce with Foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes."
13. Id., art. II, § 2, cI. 2. The treaty-making power is shared between the President
and the Senate, which must ratify the treaty by a two-thirds vote.
Under the supremacy clause of article VI, "all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
14. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977).
15. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
16. Since Chief Justice Marshall's time, the Supreme Court has rejected this alleged
authority of Congress and has tended to expand the areas in which states may act. Where
state legislation has been preempted, a balancing test is applied rather than a strict per se
approach. For a general discussion of this topic, see James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 73-74
(1st Cir. 1983).
17. Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 711, 754-55 (1835). Indian tribes are
not, however, dealt with under the Constitution on the same level as a foreign country.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
18. U.S. CONsr. art. VI.
1984]
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tribes over approximately a century ending in 1871.9 To this day,
these treaties remain valid and enforceable on the same level as
any other federal statute. In accordance with its plenary author-
ity, Congress can abrogate a treaty at any time by appropriate
legislation. 20
The major premise concerning Indian treaties and treaty rights
is that treaties are not a grant of rights and privileges to the tribe
or tribes involved, but are rather a relinquishment of such rights
by the tribe, with its consent. 2' The Constitution does not ex-
pressly confer plenary power over the Indian nations. Tribal
status as a separate political entity is also not expressly
guaranteed. Both state and federal courts, however, have con-
sistently recognized that both concepts impliedly exist within the
Constitution.21
The essence of the federal trust relationship with the Indian
tribes is another subject around which much of American Indian
law revolves. It concerns the series of responsibilities placed upon
the United States as "trustee," to protect, defend, and provide
federal services to all Indian tribes as "beneficiaries" of the rela-
tionship. 23
Care must be exercised in determining whether the federal-
Indian relationship is a mere moral obligation, a legally en-
forceable duty, or a fiduciary relationship. 2 The Constitution
itself contains no express delineation of a relationship, fiduciary
or otherwise, but again it grants authority to the federal govern-
ment. In addition to the plenary power of Congress and the
19. 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1983).
20. Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584 (1977); Confederated Salish &
Kootenai Tribes v. Namen, 534 F.2d 1376 (D. Mont. 1974), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 929
(1976). If the tribal organization of any Indian tribe is in actual hostility to the United
States, the President also retains statutory power to abrogate treaties. This power has
rarely, if ever, been enforced. 25 U.S.C. § 72 (1982).
21. Central Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); United States
v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905).
22. See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text. See also Delaware Tribal Business
Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-84 (1977).
23. This trust relationship was first established in the initial set of American Indian
cases before the Supreme Court. Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
24. The federal courts use the terms "fiduciary" and "trust" relationship inter-
changeably, but there appears to be a difference in the degree of obligation placed upon
the federal government. An example of the fiduciary obligation is discussed in United
States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535 (1980), concerning mismanagement of timber resources




presidential power to make treaties, support for the federal trust
relationship has also been found in the congressional power to
make regulations governing the territory belonging to the United
States." In any event, this assertion of "guardianship" cannot be
arbitrary in manner, but must be regarded as both authorized and
controlling. 6
The initial series of Supreme Court cases dealing with Indian
law, arising in the 1830s during the John Marshall era, presents a
basic understanding of this peculiar relationship which has
withstood legal attack to the present day.27 In Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia,28 Chief Justice Marshall characterized the Indian tribes as
neither states nor foreign countries, but as "domestic, dependent
nations," their situation analogous to that of "ward[s] to . . .
guardian." 9
Fifty years later, in United States v. Kagama,30 the Supreme
Court relied on the "guardianship" theory as a separate and
distinct basis for congressional power. 3' However, since that time
25. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2. The provision states: "The Congress shall have
power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territories
or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so constructed as to Prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular
State."
Congress alone has the right to determine the manner in which the guardianship of the
United States over the Indians shall be carried on, and possesses the broad power of
legislating for the protection of the Indians wherever they may be within the territory of
the United States. See United States v. Minnesota, 305 U.S. 382 (1939); United States v.
McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
26. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 47 (1913).
27. See cases cited supra note 15. See also Mitchel v. United States, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.)
711 (1835); Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
29. Id. at 17. Chief Justice Marshall stated that:
[T]he relation of the Indians to the United States is marked by peculiar and cardinal
distinctions which exist nowhere else .... It may well be doubted, whether those tribes
which reside within the acknowledged boundaries of the United States can, with strict
accuracy, be denominated foreign nations. They may, more correctly, perhaps be de-
nominated domestic, dependent nations. They occupy a territory to which we assert a
title independent of their will, which must take effect in point of possession when their
right of possession ceases. Meanwhile they are in a state of pupilage. Their relation to
the United States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.
30. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
31. Id. at 383-85. In affirming a conviction for murder by an Indian on an Indian
reservation, pursuant to the Major Crimes Act (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1982)), the
Court made it clear that:
These Indians are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the
United States. Dependent largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
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Congress has assumed a different posture in applying its power
pursuant to the trust relationship. This is most evident in the
twentieth-century cases involving Indian land claims. A distinc-
tion has had to be made between Congress acting as a guardian
for the Indians consistent with its plenary power, and exercising
its power of eminent domain within the meaning of the fifth
amendment.32
In Cohen's Handbook of Federal Indian Law, it is stated
that "[i]n addition to the Constitutional limitations on Congress'
power to implement its trust responsibility," other limitations
seemed to have been imposed. 3
[R]ecent cases have suggested that the trust obligation of the
United States is also a limiting standard for judging the con-
stitutional validity of an Indian statute, rather than solely a
source of power. . . . Although the Court has never spoken
directly to the issue, the requirement of a rational tie between
rights.... From their very weakness and helplessness, so largely due to the course of
dealing of the federal government with them and the treaties in which it has been
promised, there arises a duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always
been recognized by the Executive [branch] and by Congress, and by this court,
whenever the question has arisen.
(Emphasis in original).
This argument was reinforced in Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903),
where the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that allowed for distribution of certain
tribal lands to individual tribal members, notwithstanding an earlier treaty provision re-
quiring tribal consent before such lands could be alienated. The Court, basing its reason-
ing on the federal trust relationship, stated that: "Plenary authority over the tribal rela-
tions of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the beginning, the power always
being deemed a political one. .. ."
32. It is well settled that when Congress acts with respect to Indian property it does
so in one of two capacities. Either it acts as a guardian for the benefit of the Indians,
exercising its plenary power over them, in their best interest, or it exercises its power of
eminent domain, taking the Indian's property within the meaning of the fifth amend-
ment. Congress cannot, however, act in both roles simultaneously.
The Fort Berthold test, first established in Fort Berthold Reservation v. United States,
390 F.2d 686 (Ct. Cl. 1968), was applied by the Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 408-09 (1980). This test provides a guideline for distinguishing the
two types of congressional action;
Where Congress makes a good faith effort to give the Indians the full value of the
land and thus merely transmutes the property from land to money, there is no taking.
This is a mere substitution of assets or changein form and is a traditional function of
a trustee.
33. F. COHEN'S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 221-25 (R. Strickland et al. eds.
1982) [hereinafter cited as COHEN].
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss1/5
an Indian statute and the fulfillment of the trust relationship
seems to impose substantive limitations on Congress.34
The Cohen treatise notes that the trust relationship also con-
strains congressional power in a procedural manner." As a direct
result of the obligation, courts must presume that Congress' in-
tent toward the Indians is such that treaties and other acts be con-
strued in the manner in which they would naturally be
understood by the tribes.
36
The Non-Intercourse Act
The legal foundation for the eastern Indian land claims in the
last twenty years is the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790. The
Act's current version states as follows:
No purchase, grant, or lease, or other conveyance of lands, or
of any title or claim thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of
Indians, shall be of any validity in law or in equity, unless the
same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to
the Constitution. 37
One purpose of the Act was to protect the rights of Indians to
their properties by acknowledging and guaranteeing the Indian
tribe's right of occupancy to tribal lands.38 The other purpose
was to prevent the "unfair, improvident, or improper disposition
34. Id. at 221. See, e.g., Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974), where the
Supreme Court upheld an employment preference for qualified Indians in the Bureau of
Indian Affairs, pursuant to the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act. There the Court stated
that "as long as the special treatment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress'
unique obligation towards the Indians, such legislative judgments will not be disturbed."
417 U.S. at 555. See also Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85
(1977), where the Supreme Court upheld a federal statute that authorized the distribution
of funds only to certain Delaware Indians as the result of an Indian Claims Commission
decision, to the exclusion of other Delaware Indians.
35. COHEN, supra note 33, at 221.
36. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 396 (1976); Antoine v. Washington, 420
U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975); Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620 (1970), reh.
denied, 398 U.S. 945 (1970); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 10-12 (1899).
37. Ch. 33, § a, 1 Stat. 137, July 22, 1790.
38. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 668 (1974), quoting
United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345 (1941); Passamaquoddy Tribe v.
Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Dev.
Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798 (D.R.I. 1976). Another justification for the Act at the time it
was originally enacted was to prevent Indian uprisings and "preserve peace" along the
frontier. Mohegan Tribe v. Connecticut, 638 F.2d 612, 621 (2d Cir. 1980).
1984] NOTES
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of Indian lands owned or possessed by the tribe without the con-
sent of Congress. . .. ""
The practical effect of the Act was to codify existing federal
practices toward Indian nations and to remove any doubt as to
the limit of federal preemption over the states' ability to negotiate
with Indian tribes concerning real estate transactions.
The power of the Non-Intercourse Act to preempt conflicting
state statutes has never been seriously questioned. Pursuant to the
trust relationship with the federal government, the Indians'
"property becomes an instrumentality of that government for the
accomplishment of a proper governmental purpose .. ."'10 If the
land involved is not alienable by the Indians under this act, title
cannot be obtained as against them by adverse possession, con-
tract, estoppel, laches, or any other state defense, without the
United States' consent.' Even the Fourth Circuit has determined
that such a transaction is void and cannot be rendered valid by
any subsequent act.42
It is well settled that the tribe, in order to establish a prima
facie case of existence under the Act, has the burden to prove
four elements:
1). that it is or it represents an Indian tribe within [the] mean-
ing of the Act; 2). that the land at issue is covered by the Act as
tribal land; 3). that the United States has never [approved or]
consented to the alienation of the tribal land; and 4). that the
trust relationship between the United States and the tribe,
[which is] established by coverage of the Act, has never been
terminated or abandoned. 43
39. Tuscarora, 362 U.S. 99, 119 (1960); Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 441 (1926).
40. United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938).
41. Ewert v. Bluejacket, 259 U.S. 129 (1922); Heckman v. United States, 224 U.S.
413 (1912); Schaghticoke Tribe v. Kent School Corp., 423 F. Supp. 780, 784 (D. Conn.
1976); Narragansett Tribe v. Southern R.I. Dev. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 798, 804-05 (D.R.I.
1976).
42. In United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land, 97 F.2d 417, 422 (4th Cir. 1938), the
Fourth Circuit was confronted with an 1875 grant of land in North Carolina, involving a
claim under the Non-Intercourse Act. In defining the nature of the Act, the Court
stressed that:
This statute protects tribes such as these, as well as the nomadic tribes, and the protec-
tion is not affected by reason of the fact that the band has been incorporated under a
state charter, and attempts to take action thereunder .... Certainly if the land was not
alienable by the Indians, title could not be obtained as against them by adverse posses-
sion. [Citations omitted.]
Id.
43. Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915, 917 (1st Cir. 1979); Oneida Indian Nation v.
[Vol. 12
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Concerning the first element, the term "tribe" has no exact
definition but depends for the most part upon the context and
use for which it was intended in the Non-Intercourse Act. The
Act provides a federal remedy. However, the remedy is available
only to the Indian tribe as a separate entity, not to individual In-
dian tribal members suing on their own behalf.
44
Although the scope of congressional power to deal with the In-
dians is very broad, it is not unlimited. Congress cannot interact
with the Indians solely as a racial group, 45 nor can it arbitrarily
bring a group of people under its power by calling them an "In-
dian tribe." 4 6 The tribe must be something more than a private,
voluntary organization.47
The most frequently used definition was first pronounced by
the Supreme Court in Montoya v. United States,5 where the
Court explained: "By a tribe we understand a body of Indians of
the same or similar race, united in the community under one
leadership or government, and inhabiting a particular, though
sometimes ill-defined territory. . .. ,,49 This definition contains
several criteria that subsequent courts have used as a guideline
concerning the determination of a "tribe," including the
Supreme Court.
In United States v. Candelaria,50 the Supreme Court first ap-
plied the Montoya analysis to an Indian tribe seeking to prove a
prima facie case under the Non-Intercourse Act. In an action by
County of Oneida, 434 F. Supp. 527, 537-38 (N.D. N.Y. 1977); Narragansett, 418 F.
Supp. 798, 803 (D.R.I. 1976).
44. James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 72 (1st Cir. 1983); Epps v. Andrus, 611 F.2d 915,
917 (1st Cir. 1979); Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575, 581 (Ist Cir.
1979).
45. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 645 (1977).
46. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439 (1926); Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913).
47. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975).
48. 180 U.S. 261 (1901).
49. Id. at 266. See also Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 46 (1913), where the Supreme Court
upheld a criminal conviction for introducing intoxicating liquor into the Santa Clara
Pueblo of New Mexico in violation of federal statute. In determining that the tribe fell
within the statutory definition of "Indian tribe" by applying the Montoya definition, the
Court interpreted Congress' authority to define that term:
[lit is not meant by this that Congress may bring a community or body of people
within the range of this [guardian] power by arbitrarily calling them an Indian tribe,
but only that in respect of distinctly Indian communities the question whether, to what
extent, and for what time they shall be recognized and dealt with as dependent tribes
requiring the guardianship and protection of the United States, are to be determined
by Congress, and not by the courts.
50. 271 U.S. 432 (1926).
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the federal government to quiet title in certain lands held by the
Pueblo, the Court found that the Laguna Pueblo came within
protection of the Act. It also stated that an "Indian tribe,"
within the meaning of the Act, included those tribes that did not
have a federally recognized form of government."
The First Circuit agreed with this reasoning in Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton.2 The Passamaquoddy court, in applying the
Montoya definition, made it clear that federal recognition (by
treaty, statute, or otherwise) was not a prerequisite for protection
under the Act.53
The Montoya definition does have limitations, however, and
has served as the basis for denying a tribe recovery, based on lack
of standing, under the Non-Intercourse Act. The First Circuit in
1979 was called upon, in Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp.,4
to review an earlier jury determination that the plaintiff was not a
"tribe," relying on the Montoya criterion."I The issue is a factual
one, and the court of appeals refused to reverse the jury's verdict,
based on the district court's instructions. 6
Until recently, the major issue concerning the second element
51. In Candelaria, the Supreme Court explained that:
While there is no express reference in the provision to Pueblo Indians, we think it
must be taken as including them. They are plainly within its spirit and, in our opin-
ion, fairly within its words, "any tribe of Indians." Although sedentary, industrious,
and disposed to peace, they are Indians in race, customs, and domestic government,
have always lived in isolated communities, and are a simple uninformed people, ill-
prepared to cope with the intelligence and greed of other races.
271 U.S. at 441-42.
52. 528 F.2d 370 (Ist Cir. 1975).
53. Id. at 377-79. Applying the Montoyastandard, the First Circuit found that the
Passamaquoddy, Penobscot, and Maliseet tribes came within the meaning of "any Tribe
of Indians" to gain protection of the Act. This was true even though the federal govern-
ment had never dealt with these tribes in any way or manner until this litigation.
54. 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 866 (1979).
55. In Mashpee, the district court dismissed the tribe's action to recover possession
of tribal lands it allegedly lost between 1834 and 1870, without the required federal con-
sent under the Non-Intercourse Act. The tribe appealed on the grounds that the jury erred
as to the interpretation of two elements of the definition of "tribe": (1) the element of a
"leadership or government," and (2) the element that the Indians were "united in a com-
munity." The First Circuit found the situation particularly difficult because not only was
the tribe not federally recognized, but it also had a "long history of intermarriage with
non-Indians, and acceptance of non-Indians, and acceptance of non-Indian religion and
culture." 592 F.2d 575, 581 (Ist Cir. 1979).
56. As to the first element, the court determined that the tribal leaders' influence did
not have to be "binding," but that the authority must cause the people to "order their
lives ... in some significant way." The people must "follow, adopt, and obey the leader-
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss1/5
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needed to prove a prima facie case was whether the Act covered
aboriginal (or "Indian") title, as well as recognized title. 5" The
states, defendants in these eastern land claims, consistently
asserted that "tribal lands" under the Non-Intercourse Act did
not pertain to these claims because most of the holdings were not
recognized by treaty, statute, or executive order. The argument
was made that the federal government did not have fee title to In-
dian lands in those states before the Constitution was drafted,
thus fee title remained vested in the individual states (giving them
a preemptive right to purchase from the Indians).58
The issue finally came before the Supreme Court in 1974 in
Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida,59 the most recent
case involving an eastern Indian tribe asserting a violation of the
Non-Intercourse Act to reach the High Court. In declaring that
ship," and that such leadership must be "controlling . . .of significant elements in the
lives of the people." Id. at 584-87.
Concerning the second element, it is well settled that a tribe, even if federally recog-
nized, can choose to terminate its own existence. Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v.
Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977); The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1867).
Although some question remained as to the district court's jury instructions, the First Cir-
cuit did not know if the verdict was based on a finding of voluntary assimilation, but that
such a decision "would not go contrary to law." Id.
57. Aboriginal, or "Indian," title is vested in the Indian tribe based on use, oc-
cupancy, and possession of the lands since "time immemorial." The title is equivalent to
a fee interest, which remains in the United States; the tribe still possesses a possessory
right. This right is good against all but the United States and can be extinguished only by
express congressional act. United States v. Santa Fe R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1941);
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); James v. Watt, 716 F.2d 71, 74-77
(1st Cir. 1983).
However, when the federal government properly terminates the right of occupancy by
purchase, federal statute, or other express act, such act does not give rise to a "taking"
under the fifth amendment, requiring just compensation. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United
States, 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
Recognized title, on the other hand, is the Indian right to occupancy based on express
federal recognition of an established reservation, whether by treaty, federal statute, or ex-
ecutive order. Although fee title is again vested in the United States, the land is held in
trust for the tribe. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 667-74
(1974); United States v. Klamath & Modoc Tribes, 304 U.S. 119 (1938); United States v.
Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 115-16 (1938).
This strengthens the tribe's position, for unlike aboriginal title, a fifth amendment
claim for a taking, requiring fair and just compensation, arises if and when the federal
government decides to terminate the tribe's (and the reservation's) existence. Tee-Hit-Ton
Indians, 348 U.S. 272, 290 (1955).
58. Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 670 (1974); Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810).
59. 414 U.S. 661 (1974).
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all matters of Indian title, aboriginal or recognized, are to be
settled under federal law, the Court made it clear that the Act ap-
plied to all fifty states, including the original thirteen.6"
The Act also puts the burden upon the tribe to show that the
trust relationship between it and the United States, as established
by the Act, has never been terminated. 6' Thus, Congress' power
to approve land transfers to third parties under the Non-
Intercourse Act is subject to the same limitations as any other
congressional action dealing with tribal property in that it must
be an act of "guardianship."
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Candelaria, found that
a duty arose under the Act to protect the Indian Pueblo in the
ownership of its lands even though title was held only through a
grant from Spain, recognition by Mexico, and a confirmation
and patent by the United States. This duty came within the mean-
ing of "trust relationship" under the Act.6 2
Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton again provides a fine ex-
ample of the effect the Act has on an Indian tribe.63 Although the
federal government had not engaged in any treaty relations, nor
otherwise acted in behalf of the Passamaquoddy, the Penobscot,
and the Maliseet tribes, the court held that a trust relationship
60. In Oneida, the Supreme Court made it clear that:
The rudimentary propositions that Indian title is a matter of federal law and can be
extinguished only with federal consent apply in all of the States, including the original
13. It is true that the United States never held fee title to the Indian lands in the
original States as it did to almost all of the rest of the continental United States, and
that fee title to Indian lands in these States, or the preemptive right to purchase from
the Indians, was in the State (citing Fletcher v. Peck]. But this reality did not alter the
doctrine that federal law, treaties, and statutes protected Indian occupancy and that
its termination was exclusively the province of federal law.
Id. at 670.
61. See cases cited supra note 43.
62. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432, 439. The status of this same Pueblo Indian tribe was
considered in United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). The Candelaria Court,
quoting Sandoval, stated:
Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce
with the Indian Tribes, but long continued legislative and executive usage and an un-
broken current of judicial decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior
and civilized nation the power and the duty of exercising a fostering care and protec-
tion over all Indian communities.. . . It is for that body (Congress) and not for the
courts, to determine when the true interests of the Indian require his release from such
condition of tutelage.
231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913).
63. 528 F.2d 370, 375-76 (lst Cir. 1975).
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nonetheless existed. The basis of the trust status was the Act it-
self, and it vested within every American Indian tribe upon its
enactment in 1790. Once this relationship was manifest, only an
express act of Congress could abrogate it. 6
It is the effect of the Catawba Division of Assets Act upon the
Catawba Tribe's right to sue under the Non-Intercourse Act that
the Fourth Circuit Court must address en banc in the instant
case. The tribe's situation is understandably unique, and a review
of its history will greatly assist in grasping why the tribe is where
it is today.
II. History of the Catawba Indian Tribe
Long before Caucasian settlement of North America, the
Catawba Tribe occupied its aboriginal territory in what is now
North and South Carolina. Although the tribe had boasted of
continued governmental relations with the colony of South
Carolina, with the exception of the Yamassee War in 1715, the
tribe was a loyal ally of the British until the Revolutionary War.65
In the early 1700s, English and European encroachment upon
the tribe and its lands became more evident and pronounced. The
colony of South Carolina, however, desperately needed the
Catawba Tribe's lands as a buffer between it and other hostile In-
dian tribes. The colony thus made attempts to protect the tribe's
interests.66
In 1760 the Treaty of Pine Hill was entered into between the
King's Superintendent for Indian Affairs and the Catawba Na-
64. In Passamaquoddy, the First Circuit stated that: "We emphasize what is ob-
vious, that the 'trust relationship' we affirm has as its source the Non-Intercourse Act,
meaning that the trust relationship pertains to land transactions which are or may be
covered by the Act, and is rooted in rights and duties encompassed or created by the
Act." 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975).
65. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 1-15. A 1715 census conducted by the Colony of South
Carolina revealed that the Catawbas at that time were located in the same area the tribe
presently occupies and had a population of 1,470 members in seven small villages.
66. Id. at 16-21. In 1739 the provincial council of the colony passed an act, similar to
the future Non-Intercourse Act, that prohibited the obtaining of title to any Indian lands
without the prior consent of the King of England or the governor of the colony. In addi-
tion, on March 14, 1754, Governor Glenn recognized Catawba territory as that area
within a 30-mile radius of the Catawba towns, for the purpose of expressly excluding
whites.
There are accounts that before the American Revolution the Catawbas twice assisted
the colony in the defeat of other Indian tribes and that they later helped the British cause,
alongside the colony, in the French and Indian War.
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tion (represented in part by Tribal Chief Arataswa). 7 Under this
agreement, the tribe relinquished its claim to its aboriginal ter-
ritory and agreed to settle permanently on a diamond-shaped
144,000-square-acre tract of land along the Catawba River, from
which non-Indian settlers were excluded. Thus, the Crown
manifested recognition of the Catawba Nation as a "tribe" and a
reservation was established.
Despite the guarantees of the 1760 treaty, and the promises in-
cluded within the King's Proclamation of 1763 (prohibiting the is-
suance of survey warrants or patents on any lands reserved to In-
dians, or the purchase of such lands), 8 the westward movement
of the white man continued. The tribe protested that England
had failed to carry out the terms of the treaty and consequently
reasserted a right to its aboriginal lands. 69 The King of England,
meanwhile, had determined that in order to secure the
southwestern frontier of the colonies (to stem the confusion sur-
rounding the end of the French and Indian War), another treaty
between the Crown and the five major tribes of the Old South-
west was needed to ensure their allegiance and cooperation.70
The result was the Treaty of Augusta, in November of 1763, of
which the Catawba Tribe was a signatory. 7' The tribe again
agreed to remain on the 144,000-acre reservation in exchange for
new promises by the Crown that the 1760 Treaty would be en-
forced.72
Over the next eighty years, however, settlers continued to ac-
quire land within the Catawba Reservation, mainly through long-
term leases with the Indians. By the 1830s, nearly all the reserva-
tion land had been leased to non-Indians in violation of state and
federal law.73
67. Id. at 21-23. The tribe's aboriginal territory at this time was that area covered by
the Glenn Proclamation, about 2,826 square miles.
68. Id. at 25. The King's proclamation had another major purpose, i.e., to stem the
ever-increasing growth of white settlement and keep it east of the imaginary borderline
running along the crest of the Appalachian Mountains.
69. Id. at 23 n.80. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 101.
70. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 23-24.
71. Id. at 24. The five major tribes of the Old Southwest were the Creeks, the Choc-
taws, the Cherokees, the Chickasaws, and the Catawbas, with whom the king had
directed the governors of North and South Carolina, Virginia, and Georgia to negotiate.
72. Id. at 26-29. See Treaty of Augusta, Calawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1293 n.2.
Following the treaty, the reservation was surveyed by Samuel Wyly and a fort was built
for the Indians' protection.
73. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 29-46. These leases were in direct violation of the 1760
and 1763 treaties, the Proclamation of 1763, the 1754 Statement of Recognition, and the
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Thus, the stage was set for the signing of the Treaty of Nation
Ford, on March 3, 1840, entered into by the state of South
Carolina and the tribal council and chief of the Catawbas. The
Catawba Nation agreed to cede title to its 144,000 acres, vested
under the 1760 and 1763 treaties, to the state. 74 In return, South
Carolina promised to spend $5,000 to acquire a new reservation
in North Carolina, or in "some unpopulated area of South
Carolina. ' "7 The South Carolina legislature ratified the treaty,
but amended it to require that the $5,000 be used only for the
purchase of land that would not be subject to alienation. 76 It also
authorized the issue of patents to the present leaseholders on the
reservation, thus "legalizing" their property status. The United
States did not give its consent to, nor did it participate in, the
1840 treaty. 8
The terms of the Treaty of Nation Ford were never carried out.
The state did not purchase a new reservation, and the tribe
wandered homeless for more than two years. 79 Finally, in 1842,
South Carolina (through its agent, Joseph White), purchased a
630-acre plot of land located within the original reservation, for
$2,000. This land was, along with sporadic monetary payments
from the state, the sole compensation for the loss of the tribe's
reservation. 0 This one-square-mile tract continues to this day to
be held in trust for the tribe by the state, and it is where they
presently reside.
Throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s, the Catawba Tribe
sought to have the federal government assume responsibility for
newly created Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790. Yet the state made only infrequent at-
tempts to protect the tribe and its lands. In fact, in 1808, South Carolina enacted a statute
authorizing the leasing of Catawba lands; such a lease would be valid if not more than 99
years in duration and if the lease "was witnessed by the Commissioner." Id. at 43.
Another statute, enacted in 1812, declared that a leaseholder for 99 years could qualify
as a freeholder!
74. Id. at 46-48 (Treaty at Nation Ford, Mar. 3, 1840, art. I).
75. Id. at 47-48 (Treaty at Nation Ford, Mar. 3, 1840, art. II). In addition, the state
agreed in article II to pay the Indians $2,500 at the time of removal, and $1,500 cash per
year for nine years thereafter.
76. Hearings, supra note 3, at 103.
77. Brief of Appellant, at 8-9, Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d 1291.
78. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 50. It is the ratification and subsequent land transac-
tion associated with this treaty that is the subject of the pending litigation. The treaty is
(with some argument) in direct violation of the Non-Intercourse Act and satisfies the third
element needed to prove a prima facie case under the Non-Intercourse Act.
79. Id. at 48-49. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 103.
80. Hearings, supra note 3, at 104.
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its welfare. Severe economic hardship and the motivation of the
state to seek a final and permanent settlement became factors."
Another effort was initiated in 1940, centering around a joint
assistance program involving both governments. In a statement
released on March 17, 1941, the state announced that it would
condition its participation upon a release, and a quit-claim deed,
by the tribe of its claims arising out of the 1840 treaty, in ex-
change for federal assistance.8 2 The Interior Department refused
to agree to extinguish the tribal claim as a condition for bargain-
ing.83 South Carolina eventually backed down on its position,
and this led to an agreement signed by the tribe, the Department
of the Interior, and the state of South Carolina on December 15,
1943.84
The 1943 agreement, known as the "Memorandum of
Understanding," defined the responsibilities of all three parties in
providing rehabilitative assistance to the tribe. The federal
government agreed to provide certain services to the tribe (in the
areas of health, education, and economic development oppor-
tunities), and the state in turn agreed to provide additional ser-
vices and to purchase up to $75,000 worth of land for the benefit
of the tribe.85 The state then acquired 3,434 acres of farmland in
the vicinity of the 630-acre reservation (at a cost of $70,000) and
conveyed title to the Secretary of the Interior. The state did not,
however, convey title to the 630 acres.8 6
81. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 51-55. In 1904, Chief D.A. Harris retained legal
counsel for the tribe in what evolved into a nine-year struggle with the federal and state
governments, seeking redress for the loss of its reservation lands. Formal requests were
submitted to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and to the state, all of which resulted in
little or no action.
In the 1920s and 1930s, several efforts were made to bring the Catawba Tribe under the
guardianship of the United States through legislation. For example, in 1937 and 1939
legislation was introduced by South Carolina Congressman Richards that would allow for
federal services, provided the state purchased the "new" reservation lands. This bill never
made it out of committee because of opposition from the Department of the Interior and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs, directed at the state's failure to provide agreed-upon ser-
vices. Id.
82. Id. at 57.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 57-58. See also Hearings, supra note 3, at 106-07.
85. Notably absent from the memorandum is any provision aimed at extinguishing
the Catawba Tribe's land claim. Thus it was apparent, from this and from the earlier
negotiations, that none of the parties to the memorandum intended the establishment of
the federal relationship to affect in any way the tribe's existing claim arising out of the
1840 treaty.




With the advent of the termination policies of Congress in the
early 1950s, the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) appeared ready
to designate the Catawba Tribe as a likely candidate for
withdrawal of federal services. Minimal aid from the federal
government coincided with tribal dissatisfaction over the inability
of tribal members to secure financing for farm operations and
home improvements and the tribe's subjection to federal restric-
tions on the alienation of any interest in the reservation lands.17
These factors greatly contributed to the resulting unimproved and
unproductive condition of the reservation.
In 1958 efforts at securing withdrawal of federal services to the
Catawbas began in earnest with the appointment by the state of a
legislative commission and another appointment by the BIA of a
program officer to facilitate this withdrawal.88 On January 3,
1959, the Catawba General Council enacted a resolution, drafted
by the BIA, directing South Carolina Congressman Robert
Hemphill to request Congress to remove the federal restrictions
on their land. The resolution also specifically stated that nothing
in the bill should affect the status of any tribal claim against the
state of South Carolina.8 9
Congressman Hemphill then asked the Department of the In-
terior to draft the "termination" act in a manner "that would ac-
complish the desires set forth within the Tribal Resolution." 9
Hemphill presented a draft of the bill to the tribe on March 28,
1959; the tribe approved the draft by a 40-17 vote. The bill was
subsequently introduced to Congress on April 7, 1959 as H.R.
6128. 91
At the hearings on H.R. 6128 before the House Committee on
87. Hearings, supra note 3, at 107-09. At this time, the tribal affairs were ad-
ministered out of the Cherokee Agency in North Carolina, and annual federal expend-
itures for tribal services and administration amounted to no more than $5,000 per year.
Chief Gilbert Blue contended, in his testimony before the House Committee on Interior
and Insular Affairs in 1979, that the inability to secure financing was the sole factor, id.
at 108, but many other factors apparently came into play as well.
88. Id. at 108. At a meeting of tribal, local, county, and state officials in October of
1958, Associate Commissioner of Indian Affairs Lee outlined to the tribe the mechanics
of the federal withdrawal program. Numerous Catawba leaders expressed concern about
the tribe's 1840 treaty claim against the state, but were repeatedly assured that "any claim
the Catawbas had against the state would not be jeopardized by carrying out a program
with the federal goverment" for the distribution of assets. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South
Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291, 1296 (1983).
89. Id. at 108-09.
90. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 59.
91. H.R. 6128, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959).
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Interior and Insular Affairs on July 27, 1959, Associate Commis-
sioner of Indian Affairs Rex Lee testified that the Department of
the Interior had drafted "a bill along the lines we thought the In-
dians had been discussing." 92
The bill was passed out of the Committee and on September
29, 1959, Congress enacted the Catawba Division of Assets Act.93
The 1943 federal reservation was liquidated, the land sold or
signed over to individual Catawbas, and the proceeds thereof
directed to them as well. The 1842 state reservation of 630 acres,
having never been incorporated into the federal reservation, re-
mained unchanged, as did the tribe's relationship with the state
of South Carolina.94
.Since that time, the Catawba Tribe has administered a number
of programs for the social and economic benefit of its members.95
Although the tribal constitution was revoked pursuant to the
Division of Assets Act,96 the tribal government, centering around
the tribal council, the executive committee, and Chief Gilbert
Blue, has remained intact.
In 1975 the tribal executive committee, having been advised
that their situation was similar to that of the successful Passama-
quoddy Tribe, sought legal assistance. After retaining legal
counsel in May of 1976, Catawba leaders and counsel met with
the Governor of South Carolina and the State Attorney General
to discuss a possible out-of-court settlement.97
On April 2, 1977, the general council of the tribe authorized its
92. Hearings, supra note 3, at 109.
93. 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1982).
94. Hearings, supra note 3, at 109.
95. Id. at 109-11. In 1975 the tribe incorporated under the laws of South Carolina as
a nonprofit corporation in order to participate in some of the federal categorical
assistance programs that were becoming available to Indian tribes through various
agencies. The reservation has been designated by the Economic Development Administra-
tion as an "economic development area" and recently opened a new tribal center. Also,
for the past few years the tribe has administered a program under the Comprehensive
Employment and Training Act (CETA).
96. 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1981).
97. Hearings, supra note 3, at 111-12. On May 28, 1976, the executive committee re-
tained the Native American Rights Fund of Boulder, Colo., as counsel. The members of
the tribe were informed of the history of the claim and its present status, and in July,
1976, the tribe voted unanimously to direct the executive committee to pursue the claim
with the state, the state legislature, the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the federal
courts, if necessary. The March 2, 1977 meeting with South Carolina officials included





executive committee and attorneys by resolution to seek a con-
gressional settlement of the claim, rather than litigate in federal
court. The resolution, passed by the tribal members by a 102-2
vote, called for the settlement to establish a substantial reserva-
tion, to create a tribal development fund, and to reauthorize
federal recognition in return for the tribe's release of its claims to
occupied lands.99
Within a month, a meeting was held in Washington, D.C., be-
tween the tribe, the South Carolina Attorney General, Con-
gressman Holland, representatives of the White House, the
Department of the Interior, and the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). The tribe thereafter advised the OMB that its
claim was protected by the fifth amendment, in addition to asser-
ting its bargaining position.9
On August 30, 1977, after reviewing the tribe's request for
more than a year, Interior Department Solicitor Leo Krulitz an-
nounced that Interior had requested that the Department of
Justice initiate litigation on the tribe's behalf to recover posses-
sion of the 144,000 acres constituting the tribe's former reserva-
tion. 00 Based upon this, and a land-use planning study author-
ized by the tribal executive committee, 10' the tribe received a com-
mitment from Congressman Holland in December, 1977, to in-
troduce legislation on their behalf.
It is important to note that a growing minority of tribal
members were in favor of a strictly cash settlement, foregoing any
interest in the creation of a federal reservation."0 2 This dissident
98. Id. at 112-13.
99. Id. at 113-14.
100. Id. at 115. A joint letter, drafted by Attorney General McLeod and Catawba at-
torney9, was then mailed to Congressman Holland, stating that they agreed the Catawba
claim should be settled with federal money for a new reservation in York and Lancaster
counties. These two parties disagreed on the size of the reservation, however, with the
state asking for 4,000 square acres and the tribal attorneys arguing that a larger tract
(about 32,000 acres) was necessary. At a tribal meeting soon thereafter, Holland
reassured them that the guidelines of the April 2, 1977 resolution would be followed. The
tribe voted 184-139 to endorse this.
101. W. SMI & AssocIATES, PROPOSED CATAWBA INDIAN RESERVATION LAND USE
ANALYSIS (Nov. 1977), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 3, at 251-326 [hereinafter cited
as LAND USE ANALYSIS]. The purpose of the report was "to present the results of the
analysis of lands within the 1763 Claim Area which are suitable for establishing an ade-
quate land base for the Catawbas and which, therefore, could constitute a basis for
reaching the (proposed) settlement." Id. at 116. Valuation of the claim was estimated at
$1.2 billion.
102. This group had become increasingly discouraged with the settlement negotiations
over the past five years and wanted to opt out.
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group, led by David Harris, was the first tribal association to ac-
tually use legal avenues to fight their claims, filing suit in the state
courts on May 10, 1978.103 The action was settled prior to trial in
July, 1978, with a compromise that would allow these Catawbas
to opt for cash payments in lieu of an interest in tribal property,
once an agreement with the state and federal governments was
reached.10 4
On March 27, 1979, Congressman Holland introduced H.R.
3274. This legislation, according to Chief Blue, was apparently
intended to be a vehicle for promoting further negotiations and
the development of a specific settlement plan, for it contained
few details of an actual settlement." 5
The bill, sent to the House Committee on Interior and Insular
Affairs for hearings and a review, failed to reach the floor of
Congress and was rejected by both the tribe and the state of
South Carolina as being too general to resolve the substantive
issues involved. 0 6
Settlement negotiations continued, however. On July 22, 1980,
after a series of private sessions, a study commission headed by
State Senator Coleman Poag unveiled another proposal that
would authorize the Catawba Tribe to purchase as much as 4,800
acres from willing sellers for a new federal reservation. The settle-
ment also included federal money, limited federal status and ser-
103. Hearings, supra note 3, at 115-17.
104. Id. at 117. The negotiating authority of the tribe for the land claim was ex-
panded from the five-member tribal executive committee to include five representatives of
those members desiring individual cash settlements.
105. Id. The actual amount of a cash settlement was left entirely to the discretion of
the Secretary of the Interior; there was absolutely no mention of a new federal reserva-
tion, and no mention of reestablishing federal recognition of the tribe.
106. Id. at 125-28. During the course of the hearings before the House Committee on
Interior and Insular Affairs on June 12, 1979, Chief Gilbert Blue announced that three
reservation "plans" had been drawn up that he was aware of. One proposal was sub-
mitted by Wilbur Smith and Associates (see LAND USE ANALYSIS, supra note 101), one by
the State Attorney General, and one by the tribe, calling for a 10,650-square-acre reserva-
tion (including the 630-acre reservation presently owned by the state).
A spokesman for the minority of Catawbas seeking cash settlements, Claude W. Ayers,
also introduced a proposal favoring the creation of a $30 million settlement fund, with
tribal members on the membership roll allotted the right to elect either to take their pro
rata shares of the fund, or to have them applied toward the creation of a new federal
reservation. It was Ayers' contention that most of the tribal members would elect to take
their pro rata share and avoid the complex and drawn-out legal proceedings that would




vices, and $1.35 million in state aid." 7 But just as suddenly as it
had been announced, the negotiations fell through on October
26, 1980, when the state commission rejected the federal reserva-
tion element.' °0
The tribe immediately filed suit in U.S. District Court on Oc-
tober 28, 1980, to recover the entire 144,000 acres in the targeted
three-county area. The claim was based on violation of the Non-
Intercourse Act, contending that the 1840 land transaction pur-
suant to the Treaty of Nation Ford had been consummated
without the consent of the federal government.'0 9
On June 10, 1982, District Judge Joseph Willson granted the
state's motion for summary judgment. He reasoned that the tribe
could not make a prima facie case under the Non-Intercourse Act
because not only were the Catawbas not a "tribe" within the
meaning of the Act, but the trust relationship had terminated
with the enactment of the Division of Assets Act."10 He also
established a second bar to recovery by determining that the state
statute of limitations concerning real estate applied."'
The Catawba Tribe appealed that decision, and on October 11,
1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Willson's order granting
the summary judgment. The court relied on the intent of Con-
gress in enacting the "termination" legislation, along with
judicial scrutiny of the plain language of the federal statute, in
concluding that the tribe should not be precluded from attempt-
ing to make a prima facie case." 2
107. The York Observer, Oct. 23, 1983, at 1, cols. 2-3.
108. Id. at 1, col. 3.
109. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, No. 90-2050-0 (D.S.C., filed Oct. 28,
1980).
110. S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-340 (Law Co-op. 1962).
111. Judge Willson determined that pursuant to the language of the Division of
Assets Act, the laws of South Carolina applied to the tribe as well as to its individual
members. The state statute of limitations (with a ten-year limit) was thus tolled as of
1962, eighteen years before the filing of the instant litigation.
112. Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983). Said
Judge Butzner for the court:
We conclude that the Catawba Indian Tribe Division of Assets Act of 1959 did not
ratify the 1840 Treaty, extinguish the Tribe's existence, terminate the trust relationship
of the Tribe with the federal government arising out of the Non-Intercourse Act, or
make the state statute of limitations applicable to the Tribe's claim. In short, the 1959
Act is neutral with respect to the Tribe's reservation claim. It neither confirms the
claim nor extinguishes it.
Id. at 1300-01.
19841
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
The case then took an interesting turn. The state, instead of
appealing that decision, filed a petition for a rehearing en banc
under rule 40 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure. On
December 20, 1983, the Fourth Circuit granted the motion and
scheduled oral arguments to be heard before the eleven active
court of appeals' judges for the first week of June, 1984. t 1
III. Effect of the Division of Assets Act On the Catawba
Tribe's Right to Sue Under the Non-Intercourse Act
The termination policies adopted by Congress gained momen-
tum in the early 1950s, with the express aim to "as rapidly as
possible, make the Indians within the territorial limits of the
United States, subject to the same privileges and responsibilities
as are applicable to other U.S. citizens, and to end their status as
wards of the United States."" 4 This program was viewed by the
federal government as the most beneficial way to educate and
"civilize" the Indians, by assimilation rather than by autonom-
ous independence.
Federal courts have upheld Congress' general authority to
enact termination legislation as an extension of its plenary power
under the Constitution."15 The effect of termination on tribal
status is explained in Cohen's treatise this way:
Termination legislation did not literally terminate the existence
of the affected tribes. Further, its effect was not necessarily to
113. Id., Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion of Rehearing En Banc, granted Dec.
20, 1983. The state of South Carolina asserts that the Fourth Circuit panel misinterpreted
the plain language of the 1959 Catawba "termination act" with reference to prior
legislative history and subsequent administrative construction. It contends also that the
tribe does not now participate in a trust relationship with the federal government for pur-
poses of the Non-Intercourse Act.
However, the state's petition for rehearing emphasizes greatly the status of the 27,000
to 40,000 property owners presently residing within the disputed tri-county area and the
effects an adverse decision will have upon these people. See Brief for Appellee, id. at 1-2.
The "exceptional importance" standard of rule 35 contemplates cases of exceptional
legal importance, rather than the present situation of the Tri-County Landowners'
Association. Thus the court should focus upon the effect of the termination act, although
equitable measures may be imposed.
The two court of appeals judges from South Carolina, Robert Chapman and Donald
Russell, are likely to disqualify themselves, while the senior judge, Clement Haynsworth,
Jr., is ineligible due to an amendment to the Appellate Rules. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1982).
114. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1952).
115. Otradovel v. First Wisconsin Trust Co., 454 F.2d 1258 (7th Cir. 1972); Crain v.
First Nat'l Bank, 324 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1963). See cases cited supra notes 12-22, concern-




terminate all of the Federal Government's relationship with
those tribes. Tribal powers can be extinguished only by clear
and specific Congressional action. Indian tribes can be
recognized by the United States for some purposes but not for
others."' 6
This simply follows a basic principle of American Indian law,
that only an express act of Congress can abrogate inherent tribal
rights.
Thus the issue arises as to the effect of termination legislation
upon the tribes it was designed to terminate. Congress enacted a
total of twelve "termination" statutes during the approximately
fifteen-year period that these policies were advocated. ' 7 The
statutes varied in their terms, organizational aspects, and manner
of application. The courts have had few opportunities to interpret
the effects upon the tribes involved.
In examining the few litigated cases that have involved the
above maxim, it is evident that certain Indian rights, implied or
vested pursuant to an applicable treaty, will survive termination
in the absence of express congressional action.
The benchmark for determining the effects of a termination act
is the U.S. Supreme Court case of Menominee Tribe v. United
States."5s Plaintiff tribe contended that even though hunting and
fishing rights on the terminated reservation lands were not ex-
pressed in the treaty that originally created the reservation, these
rights nonetheless survived the Menominee Termination Act of
1961. ' The Court agreed with this argument; relying on the fact
that the word "treaty" did not appear in the Act, the Court
refused to adopt a "backhanded" approach to terminating such
rights, so inherently a part of the Indian culture. 20
116. COHEN, supra note 33, at 815.
117. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-565g (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§
691-708 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 721-728 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 741-760 (1982); Act of Aug. 1,
1956, ch. 843, 70 Stat. 893-96, repealed by Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, §
l(b) (1), 92 Stat. 246; Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 881, 70 Stat. 937-38, repealed by Act of
May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, § l(b) (2), 92 Stat. 246; Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 909,
70 Stat. 963-65, repealed by Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, § l(b) (3), 92 Stat.
246; Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250-52, repealed by Act of Dec. 22, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770; 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§
971-980 (1982); 72 Stat. 619.
118. 391 U.S. 404 (1967).
119. Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250-2, repealed by Act of Dec. 22, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770.
120. 391 U.S. 404 (1967). The Supreme Court refused to imply any circumstances or
intent of Congress, when it stated:
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The Ninth Circuit, following this reasoning, has had two op-
portunities to interpret the effects of the Klamath Termination
Act.' 2 ' In Kimball v. Callahan (Kimball 1),122 individual Klamath
Indian tribal members sought a declaratory judgment as to their
treaty rights to hunt, trap, and fish on their ancestral reservation.
Years before, these plaintiffs had elected to withdraw from the
tribe pursuant to the Act, exchanging their interest in tribal
property for a cash settlement. The court held that the individuals
retained these rights, notwithstanding their election to leave the
tribe, free from any state game regulations, on former Indian
land terminated by congressional act.' 23
The Klamath Termination Act itself contained a provision that
excepted fishing rights and privileges from enforcement of the
Act;' 24 however, the Kimball I court felt itself "compelled" by
the conclusion of the Menominee Court to enforce their rights
absent adverse congressional mandate and regardless of the ex-
cepting provision.121
The Oregon Federal District Court buttressed this argument in
1979 in United States v. Adair'26 by interpreting the same term-
ination act to have no effect on the treaty water rights necessary
to carry on the activities dealt with in Kimball 1.127
The provision of the Termination Act (25 U.S.C. § 899) that "all statutes of the
United States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall no longer be
applicable to the members of the tribe" plainly refers to the termination of federal
supervision. The use of the word "statutes" is potent evidence that no treaty was in
mind.
We decline to construe the Termination Act as a back-handed way of abrogating the
hunting and fishing rights of these Indians. While the power to abrogate those rights
exists (see Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 564-67), "the intention to abrogate
or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress."
391 U.S. at 412-13.
The Court also noted that not only had the tribe been allowed to keep and enforce its
tribal constitution, it had retained its original land base as well.
121. 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-565g (1982).
122. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1974).
123. 493 F.2d at 568-69.
124. 25 U.S.C. § 564m(b) (1982).
125. Defendants in Kimball argued that Menominee was distinguishable in two
respects; the Menominee Termination Act gave no option to individuals to withdraw from
the tribe and receive a cash settlement; and, although title to the reservation changed
hands in Menominee, that tribe continued to occupy the same land before and after the
termination act took effect. The Ninth Circuit rejected these arguments as inconsistent
with the Supreme Court's requirement that Congress must clearly indicate when it intends
to abrogate treaty rights. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir. 1974).
126. 478 F. Supp. 336 (D. Or. 1979).
127. The Adair court placed reliance on the 1864 treaty with the Klamath and Modoc
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss1/5
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As recently as 1982, a termination statute was the subject of
litigation. In United States v. Felter, 28 the Utah Federal District
Court was faced with the effect of the Ute Termination Act 29
upon an individual tribal member's hunting and fishing rights.
The court upheld the Indian's right to hunt and fish on former
reservation grounds, in violation of state law, despite the absence
of any express provision in the Act to this effect. The court found
these rights to be personal in nature, neither "alienable,
assignable, transferrable, or descendible."'I3 More important, the
Felter court coupled the issue of termination of the federal trust
relationship with the recognition of tribal status, rather than mere
eligibility for federal services.' 3' In addition, the Felter court cited
United States v. Heath for the proposition that a termination act
may sever the relationship between Indians and the federal
government, but will not affect their anthropological status. 3 2
Indians, in which, when the government withdraws "land from the public domain and
reserves it for a federal purpose, the government impliedly reserves appurtenant unap-
propriated water to the extent needed to fulfill the purposes of the reservation." Id. at
345. The termination act did not abrogate the Indians' water rights, and they are still en-
titled to "as much water on the Reservation lands as they need to protect their hunting
and fishing rights."
128. 546 F. Supp. 1002 (D. Utah 1982).
129. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa (1982).
130. 546 F. Supp. 1002, 1023 (D. Utah 1982).
131. Id. at 1004. Said the Oregon Federal District Court:
It is important to note that "termination" does not mean that someone's identity as
an Indian is ended [citations omitted]. Rather, what is terminated is (I) eligibility for
federal services made available to those recognized as "Indian", and (2) the duties and
powers vested in the United States regarding the management of their affairs, or their
property. Termination legislation ends a relationship between the federal government
and specific persons. It is a question of non-recognition or recognition at law of a
status, not a denial of one's personal history or heritage.
See also id. at 1004 n.3:
Nor is "termination" necessarily the end of tribal existence. Even when Congress has
enacted legislation calling for the dissolution of specific tribes, something not done by
the termination acts, the continued existence of the tribes in spite of the legislation has
led to a continuation of the federal-tribal relationship. See F. Cohen, Handbook of
Federal Indian Law 272-273 (1942 ed.) If tribal existence is to end, it is for the Indians
to end it.
132. 509 F.2d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1974). In Health the Ninth Circuit dealt with the
transfer of jurisdiction over the territory from the federal government to the state. The
court, in affirming a district court conviction for voluntary manslaughter under state law,
said:
The Klamath Termination Act . . .was intended to end the special relationship that
had historically existed between the federal government and the Klamath Tribe. While
anthropologically a Klamath Indian even after termination obviously remains an In-
dian, his unique status vis-a-vis the federal government no longer exists. Pursuant to
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
In reviewing these federal court decisions, it appears manifest
that certain Indian rights, whether mentioned within an ap-
plicable treaty or simply implied (because their basic nature is so
intertwined within the Indian culture), will survive even termina-
tion. Unless specific and direct federal action dictates otherwise,
rights such as hunting and fishing will forever attach to the tribe
and its members.
The federal trust relationship seems to encompass enforcement
of these rights and involves a legal duty (although not as pro-
nounced as before termination) to protect them. The federal trust
relationship, therefore, is more complex than it may seem at first
glance; it entails more than the mere providing of federal services
and funds.
The First Circuit in Passamaquoddy, although not faced with a
termination situation, declined to enumerate the specific contours
of the federal trust relationship under the Non-Intercourse Act. 33
In Cohen's book, the point is made, however, that although the
question has never been litigated, "the federal trust responsibility
to protect these [tribal] resources, seems to continue, like the
[treaty] rights themselves, despite the termination legislation.""',
Tribal existence appears to survive termination as well. In each of
the previous cases, the standing of the tribe or individuals in-
volved was never at issue. 3 s
Another factor that has attained prominence in this area of
American Indian law is the doctrine of statutory interpretation
known as in pari materia. In the situation concerning termination
legislation, Public Law 280 achieves great significance as a
"meaningful backdrop" against any ambiguous provisions of the
25 U.S.C. § 564g, Klamath Indians are subjected to state laws and are to be dealt with
by the law no differently than any other citizen of a state.
133. 528 F.2d 370, 379 (1st Cir. 1975).
134. COHEN, supra note 33, at 812 n.ll.
135. Pursuant to the trust responsibilities of the federal government, the tribe and its
members have the right to tile an action in federal court to have that government enforce
rights not specifically abrogated by Congress. In United States v. Adair, 478 F. Supp. 336
(D. Or. 1979), defendants argued that the Klamath Tribe lacked standing to assert hunt-
ing and fishing rights on behalf of its members. The district court disagreed, stressing that
since the tribe has the same treaty rights as the individual members, the tribe still main-
tains an interest even if it didn't have hunting and fishing rights of its own. See also
Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134
(1979), reh. denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1979); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes,




termination act. 3 6 When this doctrine is applied, courts will not
construe the two statutes independently but will interpret each
with reference to the other (giving effect to the provisions of both
acts). 37
Public Law 280 is a federal statute conferring on states exten-
sive civil and criminal jurisdiction over Indian country, thus
radically shifting the balance of jurisdictional power from the
federal government to the states.' 31 Originally, five (later six)
states were named in the statute,' 39 and any additional state may
also adopt it with the consent of the tribes involved. It does not,
however, alter or terminate the trust status of the tribes with the
federal government, and it also does not per se end their
sovereign immunity.'4 0
In Menominee Tribe v. United States, the Supreme Court
determined that because the Menominee Reservation was still In-
dian country when Public Law 280 went into effect, the Law
must be considered in pari materia with the Termination Act.' 4 '
Thus, taking the applicable sections of Public Law 280 into ac-
count, although federal supervision of the tribe was to cease and
all tribal property was to change hands, the implied hunting and
fishing rights "granted or preserved" by treaty survived termina-
tion. 4 2 That Wisconsin was one of the states that had accepted
Public Law 280 had no bearing on the outcome.
136. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588, amended by 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1982), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-26 (1982), and 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1982).
137. Menominee, 391 U.S. at 410-12; Kimball 1, 493 F.2d at 568-69; Felter, 546 F.
Supp. at 1014-17. See also Reply Brief of Appellant at 11-12, Catawba Indian Tribe v.
South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983).
138. There are, however, significant areas not delegated to the states by the statute,
particularly in the regulatory and tax fields. See COHEN, supra note 33, at 363.
139. These states are California (except the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon
(except the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except the Menominee Reserva-
tion). 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) (1982) and 28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1982). Jurisdiction was later
conferred upon the Menominee Reservation, Act of Aug. 24, 1954, ch. 910, § 2, 68 Stat.
795, and the Alaska Territory, now the state of Alaska, 18 U.S.C. § 1162(a) and 28
U.S.C. § 1369(a) (1982).
Under 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1982) (part of the Indian Civil Rights Act), enrolled tribal
members within the affected area of Indian country must accept state jurisdiction by a
majority vote of adults voting at a special election called by the Secretary of the Interior,
the tribal council, or 20 percent of the enrolled adults.
140. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (involving county regulation in the form of civil laws of
mobile homes on a reservation).
141. 391 U.S. 404, 410-12 (1967).
142. Id. at 411. The Supreme Court reasoned that:
1984]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons,
AMERICAN INDIAN LA W REVIEW
Other cases involving termination legislation have applied the
doctrine of in pari materia favorably to the Indians, stating that
Public Law 280 is simply additional evidence that Congress did
not intend to extinguish treaty or statutory rights "in the process
of transferring supervision to the states in the first place."' 43
Effect of the Non-Intercourse Act on the Catawba Nation's
"Tribal Existence"
In its initial hearing of the case, the Fourth Circuit had no dif-
ficulty in finding that the Catawba Nation was still considered a
"tribe" under the Non-Intercourse Act, notwithstanding the
Division of Assets Act. Applying the Montoya definition, the
court determined that:
Despite revocation of the Tribal Constitution, the Catawba
Tribe continued as a body of Indians, united in a community
under one leadership, and inhabiting a particular territory. In-
deed, South Carolina to this date recognizes the Tribe's ex-
istence by continuing to hold a 630 acre reservation in trust for
Presently, the tribe continues to reside on the one-square-mile
of land, about four miles south and east of Rock Hill, South
Carolina, maintaining the land base that was a crucial factor in
Menominee Tribe.'45 The tribal government, composed of the
tribal council and the executive committee, continues to exercise
sovereign authority over and to represent the 1,200 tribal
members. The tribal chief, Gilbert Blue, has maintained that
position since 1973. Racial intermarriage was once considered a
problem (in reducing the number of fullblood Catawbas left on
the reservation), but not nearly to the extent that the jury found
in Mashpee Tribe.14 6
Public Law 280 must therefore be considered in pari maleria with the Termination
Act. The two Acts read together mean to us that, although federal supervision of the
tribe was to cease and all tribal property was to be transferred to new hands, the hun-
ting and fishing rights granted or preserved by the Wolf River Treaty of 1854 survived
the Termination Act of 1954.
143. Kimball I, 493 F.2d at 567-69; Feller, 546 F. Supp. at 1014-17.
144. Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1298. See also Montoya v. United States, 180 U.S.
261 (1901).
145. 391 U.S. at 411-12 n.12.
146. Mashpee Tribe v. New Seabury Corp., 592 F.2d 575 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 866 (1979). See Charlotte O6server, Jan. 17, 1982, at 48, cols. 1-2.
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Revocation of the tribal constitution was pointed out by the
dissenting justice in the Fourth Circuit panel decision as the
deciding factor in his denying the Catawba Nation tribal status. 147
Indeed, this was considered by the courts in both Menominee and
Kimball I, where the retention of plaintiff tribes' constitutions
was relied on in declaring that tribal existence continued.', 8
However, the Montoya definition makes no mention of a tribal
constitution as a criterion; the closest analogy that can be made is
"being united in one form of leadership or government," which
the Catawbas have otherwise maintained.'4 9
The Fourth Circuit majority states that the federal government
refused to include, within the 1943 Memorandum of Understand-
ing (under which the tribal constitution was ratified), any clause
that would effectively extinguish any claims the tribe might later
have pursuant to the 1760 and 1763 treaties. Consequently, says the
Court, "[I]t would be illogical, and indeed ironic, to hold, as South
Carolina urges, that Congress intended revocation of the Constitu-
tion to defeat the same treaty claims that the parties to the
Memorandum of Understanding had refused to extinguish." ,50
The Fourth Circuit cannot deny the realization that in each
case where a federal court has considered the effect of termina-
tion legislation on tribal existence, it was concluded that there
was no impact.15' The Court also cannot deny that a "tribe" of
Indians under the Non-Intercourse Act may include those that do
not have a federally recognized form of government (pursuant to
treaty, statute, or executive order).' 52 Hence, the Catawba Tribe
should not be denied access to the courts based on a failure to
fulfill the first element under the Non-Intercourse Act.
147. Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1301-02. The sole dissenting judge (Judge Hall),
made his position clear:
In my view, the revocation of the Tribe's constitution unequivocally ended the
Catawbas' existence as a political or governmental entity under federal law and
prevents it from having the necessary standing to bring this action under the Noninter-
course [sic] Act .... One of these requirements [under the Act] is that plaintiff show
that it is or represents an Indian tribe. In my view, the revocation of the Tribe's Con-
stitution makes it impossible for plaintiff to establish this necessary element of a
prima facie case.
148. See supra notes 120, 123 and accompanying text.
149. See generally supra notes 95-108, 146 and accompanying text.
150. Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1298.
151. See supra notes 131-135 and accompanying text. It goes without dispute that
many factors will be looked at in the case of "tribal existence"; however, courts have
been lenient in allowing the "terminated" tribes to come forward with their claims.
152. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
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Effect of the Non-Intercourse Act Upon the Federal
Trust Relationship
The issue of whether a trust relationship, within the meaning
of the Non-Intercourse Act, still exists today between the federal
government and the Catawba Tribe is a much more serious one.
There is no dispute that the Non-Intercourse Act, by its mere
enactment, created a trust relationship with the tribe., In 1959,
however, the Catawba Division of Assets Act was passed. The,
pertinent section of that Act reads as follows:
The constitution of the tribe, adopted pursuant to Sections
461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 479 of this title shall be revoked
by the Secretary. Thereafter, the tribe and its members shall
not be entitled to any of the special services performed by the
United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all
statutes of the United States that affect Indians because of
their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to them, and the
laws of the several States shall apply to them in the same
manner they apply to other persons or citizens within their
jurisdiction. Nothing in this subchapter, however, shall affect
the status of such persons as citizens of the United States.5 4
The Fourth Circuit relied on two factors in ruling that the trust
relationship still exists. First, it reasoned that the res of the trust,
the 630-acre plot, was still intact and currently occupied by the
tribe, and this "right of occupancy" was honored by the United
States when it took over all claims formerly held under the
Crown. Thus, it could be abrogated only by express congressional
action (which the Division of Assets Act did not do).'"
Second, the court looked to statements made by the Bureau of
Indian Affairs when negotiations for the termination act were still
in progress. The Bureau had assured tribal members that any pro-
153. Passamaquoddy Tribe v. Morton, 528 F.2d 370, 380 (1st Cir. 1975). Although
the federal government had not otherwise dealt with plaintiff tribes before that litigation,
the First Circuit clarified the position of the tribes:
[O]nly the Non-Intercourse Act is the source of a "trust relationship", and neither
the decision below, nor our own is to be read as requiring the Department of the In-
terior to look to objects outside the Act in defining its fiduciary obligations to the
Tribe... A fiduciary relationship in this context must indeed be based upon a specific
statute, treaty or agreement which helps define, and, in some cases, limit the relevant
duties; but, as we have held, the Non-Intercourse Act is such a statute.
154. 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1982) (emphasis added).




gram carried out by the federal government concerning the dis-
tribution of assets would not affect any claim the tribe might later
have against the state involving the "original" reservation. 15 6
It is not at issue in this situation that the "special services,"
formerly provided by the federal government, were to be ter-
minated both as to the tribe and as to its individual members.' 7
But, as seen in prior case law involving termination acts, this is
only one facet of the trust relationship.
One purpose of the Non-Intercourse Act was to assert the
preemptive effect of federal law concerning land transactions and
to acknowledge and guarantee each tribe's right to the occupancy
of their lands. A duty is thus vested with the federal government
to acknowledge and protect this right.'58
The Fourth Circuit stresses the Catawbas' "right to
occupancy" to the 630 acres, upon which the tribe has resided for
the past 141 years, as evidence of the continuing relationship. 5 9
The state itself openly declared in 1975 that it has owned this land
uninterruptedly during this entire period, so there is no dispute as
to who has retained continuous fee title. 60
If the court en banc upholds the panel court's decision and
reasoning, a new dimension will have been added to further
define the quality of the federal trust relationship. The previous
cases dealing with termination all relied to some degree on treaty
rights (implied or expressed). Does the "right of occupancy"
under federal law fall within this same category?
The issue presented, then, is whether the Division of Assets Act
is the "express act of Congress" needed to extinguish this right to
occupancy, and if not, is this "right" valid evidence of a continu-
ing trust relationship within meaning of the Non-Intercourse Act?
Indeed, what was the intent of Congress in enacting the Catawba
termination act?
It should be noted at this juncture that although Congress
ratified the termination acts with a basic objective in mind,' 6'
each act was tailored to fit the particular circumstances surround-
156. Id. at 1299-1300. See also id. at 1296 n.9, concerning a memorandum from a
BIA program officer involving these statements.
157. See 25 U.S.C. § 935, cl. 1 (1982).
158. See cases cited supra notes 38-39, 57.
159. Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1298-1301.
160. 156 Op. Att'y Gen. S.C. 3988 (1975). See also Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1293
n.3.
161. See H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83d Cong., 1st Sess. (1952).
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ing the tribe affected. Legislative history supports this theory but,
in addition, scrutiny of the section of each act where termination
of the federal trust relationship was involved reveals that Con-
gress utilized the same pattern of statutory language to enforce
termination of the relationship. This was in the form of three
clauses; the first clause pertained to termination of the "special
services," the second related to the inapplicability of federal law,
and the third discussed the substituted applicability of "the laws
of the several states.' ' 62 These three clauses varied greatly in their
application to the tribe, the individual tribal members, or both,
and should be taken as additional evidence that Congress took in-
to consideration each tribe's specific social and economic situa-
tion.
Two of the twelve termination statutes are, in every respect, ex-
plicitly directed at both the tribe and its members. The major
purpose of the Alabama-Coushatta Termination Act was to
follow, as nearly as possible,'63 the objectives of House Con-
current Resolution 108, concerning federal supervision and con-
trol.'6 4 A resolution adopted by the tribe on February 13, 1953,
urged that the Secretary of the Interior be required "to recom-
mend the necessary legislation that would accomplish a complete
transfer of trust responsibilities" from the federal government to
the state of Texas.' 65 This is evident from the plain language of
162. 25 U.S.C. § 564q (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 677v (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 703(a) (1982); 25
U.S.C. §§ 722, 726 (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 757(a) (1982); Act of Aug. 1, 1956, ch. 843, § 13,
70 Stat. 896, repealed by Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, § 1(b) (1), 92 Stat.
246; Act of Aug. 2, 1956, ch. 881, § 3, 70 Stat. 937, repealed by Act of May 15, 1978,
Pub. L. No. 95-281, § 1(b)(2), 92 Stat. 246; Act of Aug. 3, 1956, ch. 909, § 8, 70 Stat.
964, repealedby Act of May 15, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-281, § l(b) (3), 92 Stat. 246; Act of
June 17, 1954, ch. 303, § 10, 68 Stat. 252, repealed by Act of Dec. 22, 1973, Pub. L. No.
93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770; 25 U.S.C. § 935 (1982); 25 U.S.C. § 980 (1982); 72 Stat. 619,
§ 10(b).
163. 25 U.S.C. § 721-728 (1982).
164. The enactment of S. 2744 would carry out the sense of Congress, as expressed in
House Concurrent Resolution 108, concerning the termination of Federal supervision
and control over the Indian tribes and individual members thereof located within the
state of Texas. This bill is also in accord with the policy of the Department of the In-
terior for a termination of federal supervision and control over the affairs of the In-
dian tribe and its members whenever feasible .... This bill provides for the issuance
of a proclamation at the time of such conveyance, declaring termination of the
Federal trust relationship to these Indians, and provides that from that date on they
will not be entitled to services from the United States because of their status as In-
dians. ....
H.R. REP. No. 2491, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3119, reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 3119-20.




the resulting statute; the clauses terminating federal services,
determining federal law to be inapplicable, and making state law
controlling are directed at both the tribe and its individual
members. 6 '
Similar objectives were sought in the enactment of the termina-
tion act of the Ponca Tribe of Nebraska.' 67 This is manifest,
again, by the plain language of the statute, where all three clauses
applied to both the tribe and its members.' 68
Two more termination statutes, however, depict just the op-
posite situation. The three clauses contained within the provision
of the California Rancheria Act of 1958 pertaining to termination
of the federal trust relationship 169 apply only to the individual In-
dians. 70 This may have been due in part, however, to the great
difficulty Congress had in determining actual "tribes" in that
situation. '7'
The termination provision of the Ute Termination Act also ap-
plies only to its individual tribal members. 7 This Act was de-
signed to separate and distribute the assets (in the form of stock
shares) of the mixed-blood tribal members, and to terminate any
relationship those Indians had with the tribe (while leaving the
fullblood Utes unaffected). 73 The Supreme Court made it clear
in Affiliated Ute Citizens of Utah v. United States 71 that this Act
166. 25 U.S.C. §§ 722, 726 (1982).
167. 25 U.S.C. §§ 971-980 (1982).
168. 25 U.S.C. § 980 (1982).
169. Act of Aug. 18, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-671, 72 Stat. 619.
170. Pub. L. No. 85-671, § 10(b).
171. S. REP. No. 85-1874, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1958). See also Reply Brief of Ap-
pellant at 6 n.6, Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d 1291. The Act, involving forty-one reservations
or rancherias located in California, constantly makes reference to Indians, and not one
mention of the word "tribe." It did not even deal with tribal assets because the "groups
were not well-defined," and the lands had been acquired for the Indians generally rather
than for specific groups.
172. 25 U.S.C. §§ 677-677aa, 677v (1982).
173. In Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, the Court wrote:
After each mixed-blood had received his distributive share, directly or in whole or in
part through the device of a corporation or other entity in which he had an interest,
federal restrictions were to be removed except as to any remaining interest in Tribal
property, that is, the unadjudicated or unliquidated claims against the United States,
gas, oil, and mineral rights, and other tribal assets not susceptible of equitable and
practical distribution .... The Secretary of the Interior then was to issue a proclama-
tion "declaring that the Federal trust relationship to such individual is terminated."
[Citations omitted].
406 U.S. 128, 135 (1972). The Act also allowed the mixed-bloods to organize, adopt a
constitution and bylaws, and organize in a group.
174. 406 U.S. 128 (1972).
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did not purport to terminate the trust status of the undivided
assets, which remained tribal property.'75 The district court in
United States v. Felter confirmed this to be the policy of the Act
in rendering its decision. 7
6
As to seven of the remaining eight termination statutes, the
first two clauses apply only to the individual tribal members,
while the third clause (applicability of the "laws of the several
states") applies to both the tribe and its members. 177 The
Menominee and Klamath termination acts fail into this third
category. '7 The Supreme Court stated that the purpose of the
Menominee act was to "provide for the orderly termination of
federal supervision over the property and members of the Tribe."
The Secretary of the Interior had in fact transferred the real and
personal property of the tribe to Menominee Enterprises, Inc.
(the incorporated tribe), and the state integrated the former reser-
vation into its county system of government.' 79
The Ninth Circuit, in Kimball v. Callahan (Kimball II),18o
stated that the purpose of the Klamath act was to "terminate
federal supervision over the trust and restricted property of the
Klamath Tribe of Indians, to dispose of federally owned property
acquired or withdrawn for the administration of Indians' affairs,
and to terminate federal services furnished the Indians because of
their status as Indians."'"' Each member of the tribal roll had to
elect whether to take his interest in tribal property in cash or to
remain in the tribe and "participate in a nongovernmental Tribal
management plan."' 2
However, the third clause within these two acts, stating that
state law shall apply to both the tribe and its members, seems to
175. Id. at 133-39.
176. Felter, 546 F. Supp. at 1005-07.
177. See statutes cited supra note 162.
178. Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 250-52, repealed by Act of Dec. 22, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-197, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 770; 25 U.S.C. §§ 564-565g (1982).
179. In Menominee, Wisconsin questioned whether the new corporation, to which all
the tribal assets were transferred pursuant to the termination act, was the "successor
entity" to the tribe and the present holder of the fishing and hunting rights. The Supreme
Court declined to answer, and reserved the question of who were the actual
"beneficiaries" of the rights. 391 U.S. 404, 408-10 (1968).
180. 493 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1019 (1979).
181. Id. at 567.
182. Id. See also, 25 U.S.C. § 564e(c) (1982). Of the 2,133 Klamaths on the final
tribal roll, 1,660 elected to withdraw from the tribe, take their interest in cash, and for all




have no effect at all, at least upon that facet of the trust relation-
ship protecting the treaty hunting and fishing rights of the tribes.
In both cases, state game regulations and restrictions did not
apply. 183
The twelfth act is the Catawba Division of Assets Act. 8 4 A
number of sources are available to aid in discerning the intent of
Congress in creating this legislation, and all appear to support a
common inference: Congress intended to divide the tribal assets
among the individual members, without affecting any claim the
tribe may later have against the state. The earlier reference to the
representations made by the BIA, assuring tribal members that
such legislation would have no effect on claims against the state,
is one such event that can support this inference. 8 5 Further, the
plain wording of the January 3, 1959 tribal resolution, which ap-
pointed Congressman Hemphill to draft legislation for the
distribution of tribal assets, specifically conditioned tribal sup-
port of such legislation on leaving the treaty reservation claim
unaffected.'8 6 The House of Representatives and the Senate
Committee reports both stated that the purpose of H.R. 6128 (the
future Division of Assets Act) was only to "provide for the divi-
sion of assets of the Catawba Tribe of South Carolina, among its
enrolled members, in approximately equal shares."'8 7 The cor-
respondence from then-Assistant Secretary of the Interior Roger
Ernst to House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs Chair-
man Wayne Aspinall also stated that the major objective of the
bill was to divide those assets and to lift all federal restrictions
upon the Indians concerning their land. 8
183. See Act of June 17, 1954, ch. 303, 68 Stat. 252, § 10 (in effect at the time the
Menominee Tribe filed their lawsuit): "and the laws of the several states shall apply to the
tribe and its members in the same manner as they apply to other citizens or persons within
the jurisdiction." See 25 U.S.C. 8 564q (1982) (the Klamath Termination Act): "and the
laws of the several States shall apply to the Tribe and its members in the same manner as
they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction."
184. 25 U.S.C. §§ 931-938 (1982).
185. Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d at 1296 n.9.
186. HISTORY, supra note 8, at 59 (text of the resolution). The tribe authorized Hemp-
hill to integrate certain provisions within the bill to be put before Congress, including in
pertinent part, "to do all things necessary to accomplish the purposes of this legislation at
no cost to the Catawba Indians or claim against their assets, and that nothing in this
legislation shall affect the status of any claim against the State of South Carolina by the
Catawba Tribe."
187. S. REP. No. 863, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1959) reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2671, 2672.
188. H.R. REP. No. 910, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG.
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In the face of this evidence, the state is hard pressed to contend
that the intent of Congress was to effectively terminate all rela-
tions with the tribe, end its existence, and sever the trust relation-
ship created by the Non-Intercourse Act.
South Carolina argues that the Division of Assets Act covered
the entire reservation occupied by the tribe in 1959 (the 630 acres,
plus the 3,434 acres purchased by the state for the federal govern-
ment, pursuant to the 1943 memorandum).' 89 Yet, when the dust
cleared and the assets were divided among the individual
members, the 630 acres remained intact, owned by the state in
trust for the tribe. Although the land is not owned by the United
States, it is suggested that a duty seems nevertheless to remain
with the federal government to protect the right of occupancy still
held by the tribe. 90
The state argues further that state law now applies both to the
tribe and its individual members by the terms of the third clause
within the provision discussing the federal trust relationship, so
that the state statute of limitations concerning real estate transac-
tions precludes the tribe's claim altogether.19' It is evident that no
termination statute is worded so poorly as the one involving the
Catawba Tribe, with particular attention focused on the second
and third clauses.' 9 The key seems to be the correct interpreta-
tion of the word "them." To whom does "them" refer? Does
the term encompass tribal members individually or collectively as
a tribal group? Only one other such statute, the California Ran-
cheria Act, utilizes the word "them" in such a manner. In that
& AD. NEWS 2671, 2673. Ernst wrote that:
The bill closes the membership roll, and provides for the distribution of all tribal pro-
perty among the members in approximately equal shares. Members who have
assignments of land from the Tribe, or members of their families, are given the right
to select the assignments as parts of their distributive shares. The remainder of the
Tribal property will be sold and the proceeds of the sale will be distributed. Any pro-
perty that is not sold within two years will be conveyed to a trustee for liquidation and
distribution. When the program is completed the Catawba Indians will cease to be
subject to the Federal Indian laws, but their status and rights under South Carolina
law will not be affected. [Emphasis added.]
189. See Brief of Appellee at 37-40, Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d 1291.
190. See supra text at notes 40-64.
191. See Brief for Appellee at 18-30, Catawba Tribe, 718 F.2d 1291. See also the
South Carolina statute of limitations, which reads as follows: "No action for the recovery
of real property or for the recovery of the possession thereof shall be maintained unless it
appears that the Plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor or grantor, was seized or possessed of
the premises in question within ten years before the commencement of this action." S.C.
CODE ANN. § 15-3-34 (Law Co-op 1962).




situation, however, there is no doubt "them" referred only to in-
dividuals.' 93 From the above investigation of Congress' legislative
intent, it would appear that in the Catawba Act, "them" meant
that state law applied only to individual Catawbas to preserve
their claims against South Carolina.
What if the Fourth Circuit Court sitting en banc finds that
state law applies to the tribe as well? It is contended here that the
tribe has two strong arguments in support of its theory that the
tribe's "right to occupancy" is valid evidence of a continuing
federal trust relationship that has survived the Division of Assets
Act.
First, the doctrine of in pari materia should apply to a tribe's
"right to occupancy" in the same manner as it applies to treaty
hunting and fishing rights. The applicable section of Public Law
280 states as follows:
Nothing in this section shall authorize the alienation, encum-
brance, or taxation of any real or personal property, including
water rights, belonging to any Indian or any Indian tribe,
band, or community that is held in trust by the United States
or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the
United States; or shall authorize regulation of the use of such
property in a manner inconsistent with any Federal treaty,
agreement, or statute or with any regulation made pursuant
thereto; or shall deprive any Indian or any Indian tribe, band,
or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded
under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to
hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or
regulation thereof.' 94
193. 72 Stat. 619, § 10(b) (1983). The pertinent section states:
After the assets of a rancheria or reservation have been distributed pursuant to this
Act, the Indians who receive any part of such assets, and the dependent members of
their immediate families, shall not be entitled to any of the services performed by the
United States for Indians because of their status as Indians, all statutes of the United
States which affect Indians because of their status as Indians shall be inapplicable to
them, and the laws of the several States shall apply to them in the same manner as
they apply to other citizens or persons within their jurisdiction. Nothing in this Act,
however, shall affect the status of such persons as citizens of the United States.
Although there has been litigation involving this termination act, the issue was due pro-
cess in the administration of the Rancheria Act, rather than mere interpretation. Duncan
v. United States, 597 F.2d 1337 (Ct. Cl. 1979), vacated 446 U.S. 903 (1980); Knight v.
Kleppe, No. C-74-0005 WTS (N.D. Cal. Jan. 23, 1976), reprinted in part at 3 INDIAN L.
REP. g-50 (1976).
194. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(b), 1322(b) (1982); 28 U.S.C. §
1360(b) (1982) (emphasis added).
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Within this section is the same policy that is the foundation for
the Non-Intercourse Act. The federal courts have consistently
construed this section in pari materia with the termination statute
at issue, and in each situation concerning hunting and fishing
rights, the courts have upheld those Indian rights. Alienation of
real property is included within this section; therefore, the doc-
trine should apply to "rights to occupancy" as well.
Second, the Catawba Tribe's "right to occupancy" to both the
630 acres and the 144,000 acres should be equated with treaty
hunting and fishing rights as deserving protection under the Non-
Intercourse Act. In Menominee, the issue was implied treaty
rights. In Kimball, it was express treaty rights to hunt and fish. In
Adair, it was implied water rights related to the rights protected
in Kimball. In each case, the provision in the termination act
eliminating the federal trust relationship specifically stated that
state law was to apply to the tribe as well as to the individual In-
dians. Yet, in each case, state regulations were held not to apply.
The Catawba Tribe has resided on the same parcel of state-
owned land for 141 years. It has resided in the same area since
"time immemorial" and had its "right to occupancy" officially
recognized by England in the 1760 and 1763 treaties. The federal
government maintains a duty to protect this right stemming from
its position as guardian and pursuant to its plenary power over
Indian tribes in general. The Division of Assets Act did not ex-
plicitly mention or even refer to the 630-acre tract; absent such an
express act of Congress, this right to occupancy survives the ef-
fects of the termination act.
South Carolina cites the Supreme Court case of Schrimpscher
v. Stockton"'9 and its progeny for the proposition that the state
statute of limitations begins to run once the federal restrictions
on the alienation of Indian land have been lifted.' 96 The state's
argument, however, assumes that the federal trust relationship
between the tribe and the federal government has been dissolved.
The argument also assumes that the 1959 Division of Assets Act
impliedly ratifies the 1840 Treaty at Nation Ford, which is the
alleged violation of the Non-Intercourse Act-the subject of this
litigation.
195. 183 U.S. 290 (1901). In Schrimpscher, the Indian heirs of a Wyandotte Indian
sued to recover lands their predecessor had conveyed to the defendants. The conveyance
had been consummated when there had been a restriction on alienation. A subsequent
treaty had been ratified, however, that lifted all restrictions. The Supreme Court held that
the plaintiffs were barred by the Kansas statute of limitations.




The Fourth Circuit has applied the Schrimpscher line of
reasoning in United States v. 7,405.3 Acres of Land.19 7 This case
concerned an 1875 grant of land in North Carolina. The court
made it clear that not only will state defenses such as adverse
possession and a statute of limitations not apply to a valid Non-
Intercourse Act claim, but that operation of state law cannot
make valid an otherwise void transfer of Indian lands.'98 This
reasoning has never been applied to the effects of a termination
act, but it would appear that if a trust relationship still exists,
once a violation of the Non-Intercourse Act is manifest no subse-
quent state act will rectify it.
This, of course, creates a circular argument because applica-
tion of state law will hinge on the Fourth Circuit's en banc deter-
mination on the trust relationship issue. If such a relationship is
held to exist today, not only will the tribe have proved a prima
facie case under the Non-Intercourse Act, but application of the
state statute will be precluded as well. From the qualities present
within the Catawba Tribe's "right to occupancy," this should be
the case.
Assuming a favorable verdict is rendered for the tribe, addi-
tional conflicts will still require resolution. Continued litigation to
address these issues would seem to be the least beneficial alter-
native. The tribe needs assistance for its twelve hundred
members, who live in severe poverty and economic depression on
its one-square-mile of unproductive land; the state is in jeopardy
of losing a 225-square-mile resort area to the tribe and the federal
government; and the present landowners, through the Tri-County
Landowner's Association, are concerned with the current encum-
brance on their otherwise marketable land title and are threatened
with the possibility of relocation.
The door is not yet closed to the possibility of a legislative
settlement, even though H.R. 3274 failed to pass within the
House Committee. Appropriate legislation could firmly delineate
the duties, responsibilities, and limitations of all parties involved.
Congress has codified settlement acts on at least three occasions,
with the settlements varying in the amount of control retained by
the tribe and the resulting organizational structure. 99
197. 97 F.2d 417 (4th Cir. 1938).
198. Id. at 422. See supra note 42.
199. See, e.g., Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act of 1971, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628
(1982). Congress determined that the Alaska natives would receive fee title to more than
40 million acres of land, payments from the United States Treasury of $460 million over
1984]
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The Catawba Tribe, with the exception of the faction seeking a
strictly cash settlement, has remained firm as to what should be
incorporated into any settlement. Reinstatement of federal
recognition is one aspect that should be incorporated into the
settlement, with powers of self-government over the reservation
and its members. e0  A second aspect is the complete extinguish-
ment of all land claims by the tribe and the United States. A third
is the establishment of a settlement fund in order to cover: (1)
purchasing a feasible reservation site (proposed size was 10,650
acres); (2) establishing a tribal development fund of approxi-
mately $5 million; and (3) adequate funds to pay off those
Catawbas seeking to exchange their interest in tribal property
(and tribal membership) for a cash settlement.20'
The final condition is a jurisdictional agreement entered into
by the tribe, the federal government, and the state of South
Carolina, involving both civil and criminal matters and an en-
forceable regulatory network. 2  As it now stands, the Division of
Assets Act requires clarification with respect to application of
state law to the tribe.
an eleven-year period (1972-1983), and royalties of 2% up to a ceiling of $500 million, on
mineral development. In addition, Congress mandated that the natives involved, organ-
ized as groups or eligible through the village they resided in, would have to incorporate
under state law before any benefits could be received.
See also Rhode Island Indian Land Claims Settlement Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §§
1701-1716 (1982), enacted as a direct result of the litigation between the Narragansett
Tribe and the state. The tribe was awarded $3.5 million plus certain lands (not named
directly in the Act), and authorized to incorporate under state law, holding their lands in
the same manner a corporation would. The settlement lands, according to the Act, are to
be subject to state civil and criminal jurisdiction. Concerning the federal trust relation-
ship, the Act states that the United States shall have no further duties or liabilities to the
tribe, their corporation, or their lands, other than implementing the settlement legislation.
See also Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act of 1980, 25 U.S.C. §§ 1721-1735 (1982).
The settlement consisted of two sets of legislation, one federal and one state.
The federal statute established two separate trust funds; in addition, the existing
holdings of the Passamaquoddy and Penobscot tribes, together with the first 150,000
acres acquired for each tribe with funds from the land acquisition fund, were to be held in
trust by the United States. However, the Act abandoned the corporate structure in favor
of a modified plan to retain tribal sovereignty.
200. 25 U.S.C. §§ 861-861c (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 903-903f (1982). See also Hearings,
supra note 3, at 122-32.
201. Hearings, supra note 3, at 124.
202. Id. at 124, 130-32. Chief Gilbert Blue testified at the 1979 House Committee
hearings that the tribe favors a regulatory pattern not unlike that established by Public
Law 280. The tribe would reserve the right to regulate the use of reservation lands, to
license and to tax reservation businesses, as well as to retain access and riparian rights to
the Catawba River, pursuant to state law.
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol12/iss1/5
A final option open to the Catawba Tribe is whether to follow
the lead of other tribes in adopting a more formal corporate
structure," 3 not only as a means of control of their assets but as a
means of compromise. The Catawbas presently maintain non-
profit corporate status; however, representatives of the Tri-
County Landowners' Association have advocated a more rigid,
nonfederally recognized structure. °0 It has been established many
times that the United States cannot deal with an Indian tribe
solely on a racial basis, but must view the tribe as a separate
political entity. The tribe, in choosing such a corporate form of
existence, will be denied that status and will lose many of the ad-
vantages enjoyed by retaining it.205
Conclusion
Catawba Indian Tribe v. South Carolina represents a classic
case of first impression for the federal courts in determining the
effects of a termination act upon an Indian tribe's standing to sue
under the Non-Intercourse Act. Each termination act was ex-
ecuted for a particular purpose, focusing on the circumstances of
the tribe in question. However, because our system of
jurisprudence has not been afforded many opportunities to test
the legal effect of these acts, great care must be taken to ensure
that the intent of Congress is enforced, particularly where the
terms of the statute are highly ambiguous and subject to er-
roneous interpretation.
203. See 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1628 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1716 (1982); 25 U.S.C. §§
1721-1735 (1982). See also discussion, supra note 199. A comprehensive examination of
South Carolina's corporation statutes, including nonprofit status, is not included within
this article.
204. The York Observer, Oct. 23, 1983, at 1, col. 1; at 4, col. 1. Lewis Whisonant,
president of the Tri-County Landowners' Association, remarked during an interview:
Back in 1980, that's what really brought those talks down, that one word ["federal"].
As far as I'm concerned, if they would drop the word "federal" and be like a cor-
poration, if they could buy land on the open market and be subject to state and
federal laws like everyone else and pay taxes, I personally wouldn't have any question
about it.
205. For example, tribal governments generally enjoy sovereign immunity from ac-
tions by tribal members. The corporation, however, is not always immune from the
derivative actions of its shareholders, and the officers and directors may be held liable for
breaches of their duties of loyalty, good faith, and reasonable care.
The tribe, more importantly, is a form of governmental entity occupying unique status
under the Constitution, with certain inherent powers to act and govern its people, land,
and other interests. The corporation, on the other hand, is a creature of state statute, sub-
ject to state laws and limitations.
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If any duty remains with the federal government to protect the
rights of a "terminated" tribe, it will be based on a continuing
trust relationship. The Non-Intercourse Act, by its ratification in
1790, created such a legally enforceable relationship. Litigation
such as that in United States v. Candelaria and Passamaquoddy
Tribe v. Morton has been instrumental in helping to define this
relationship in general. For the most part, however, courts have
shied away from actually determining the qualities and limits of
'the relationship.
The Fourth Circuit is in an unique situation. When the doc-
trine of statutory interpretation known as in pari materia is ap-
plied to two acts following the same scheme, both statutes in-
volved are construed with respect to each other, to get a better
understanding of both. In this case, however, the situation arises
where two statutes with opposite objectives clash, and the Fourth
Circuit is thus presented with an opportunity to determine the
contours of the trust relationship inherent in both legislative acts.
If the court grants the Catawba Tribe standing, it will illustrate
the far-reaching effect of the Non-Intercourse Act upon tribal
dealings with the individual states.
It can already be seen that, in establishing a prima facie case
under the Non-Intercourse Act, tribal existence and an identifi-
able land base are but two elements constituting evidence that a
trust relationship exists. However, in determining the residual ef-
fect of the federal trust relationship under the Non-Intercourse
Act, after attack by another statute, the parameters of the rela-
tionship can be better defined for future Non-Intercourse Act
claims.
Editor's Note: There have been two recent developments in the
continuing litigation discussed in this Note concerning the Catawba
Tribe and the Oneida Nation.
On August 17, 1984, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, sit-
ting en banc, adopted the panel decision in Catawba Indian Tribe
v. South Carolina, 718 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1983). The per curiam
and concurring opinions are located at 740 F.2d 305 (4th Cir.
1984). South Carolina then filed a petition for certiorari with the
United States Supreme Court. The Court invited the Solicitor
General to file a brief expressing the views of the United States
on the certiorari decision. South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe,
105 S.Ct. 899 (1985). At this writing, the parties are awaiting oral




In Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 444 U.S. 661
(1974) (Oneida I), discussed in the Note text accompanying note
59, the Supreme Court decided that the Oneidas stated a claim
for possession of the land under federal law and remanded the
case to the federal district court for trial. The district court then
found the defendant counties liable for damages for wrongful
possession of the Oneida lands, and ruled that the state of New
York, a third party defendant, must indemnify the counties. 434
F. Supp. 527 (N.D.N.Y. 1977). The Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals affirmed both the liability and the indemnification. 719 F.2d
525 (2d Cir. 1983). On appeals by both the counties and state, the
Supreme Court affirmed in part, holding that the Non-Intercourse
Act did not preempt the tribes' right of action under the federal
common law. The Court, however, found there was no ancillary
jurisdiction in the federal courts over the indemnity question.
County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S.Ct. 1245 (1985).
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